[Review of \u3ci\u3ePay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation\u3c/i\u3e] by Hallock, Kevin F
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
7-2006 
[Review of Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation] 
Kevin F. Hallock 
Cornell University, kfh7@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Labor 
Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
[Review of Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation] 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Every once in a while someone comes out with an important book concerning corporate 
governance or executive compensation. Like Aldolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means's The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1932) and Graef S. Crystal's In 
Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 
Bebchuk and Fried's new book is thought-provoking and interesting. It is a very important book and should 
be read not just by those interested in executive pay or corporate governance but by anyone interested in 
how corporations work. 
Keywords 
labor markets, personnel economics, human resources, wages 
Disciplines 
Human Resources Management | Labor Economics | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hallock, K. (2007). [Review of the book Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive 
compensation] [Electronic version]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 59(4), 672-674. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/243/ 
Required Publishers Statement 
Copyright held by Cornell University. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/243 
672 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR R E L A T I O N S REVIEW 
critically evaluate such findings in the context 
of current recruitment and selection theory. 
Yet, this book does provide an interesting per-
spective on the potential forces driving the ho-
mogenization of talent in leading companies. 
Another thoroughly examined subject in this 
volume is how young knowledge workers so-
cially construct and manage their employabil-
ity. Through a series of interviews, the authors 
focus on assessing not only recent college and 
university graduates' expectations of finding 
well-paid and rewardingjobs but also the differ-
ent strategies employed by graduates in the 
competition for tough-entry jobs. This assess-
ment leads to the identification of two "ideal 
types" of graduates—Players and Purists. The 
Players understand employability as a positional 
game and market themselves in ways that con-
form to the requirements of employers. Alter-
natively, the Purists view the competition as a 
meritocratic race and focus on finding employ-
ment that offers the right fit with their knowl-
edge, skills, and aspirations. This analysis pro-
vides insight into how those at the top end of the 
labor market have responded to changes in 
employer requirements and the intense compe-
tition for top knowledge jobs. The authors also 
suggest that these differences between the Play-
ers and Purists highlight the ethical tension 
around the question of which routes to success 
are legitimate. One fertile ethics-related ques-
tion is whether Player behavior leads to com-
petitive advantage in the quest for top knowl-
edge jobs. 
Overall, The Mismanagement ofTalentpresents 
a compelling alternative view of the "war for 
talent." Brown and Hesketh unabashedly chal-
lenge the dominant discourse of the knowl-
edge-driven economy and provide a critical 
analysis of current management practice and 
public policy. While many readers may take 
issue with the authors' sometimes controversial 
arguments, I recommend this volume to anyone 
who is not afraid to follow a provocative explo-
ration of the knowledge-based economy's far-
reaching implications. 
Bradford S. Bell 
Assistant Professor 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Cornell University 
Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Prom-
ise of Executive Compensation. By Lucian 
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. Cambridge , Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2004. xii, 279 pp . 
ISBN 0-674-01665-3, $24.95 (c lo th ) . 
Every once in a while someone comes out 
with an important book concerning corporate 
governance or executive compensation. Like 
Aldolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means's The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1932) and Graef S. 
Crystal's In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation 
of American Executives (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1991), Bebchuk and Fried's new book is thought-
provoking and interesting. It is a very impor-
tant book and should be read not just by those 
interested in executive pay or corporate gover-
nance but by anyone interested in how corpora-
tions work. 
The main idea in Pay without Performance is 
that there has been a fundamental breakdown 
in how executives are paid in the United States. 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that most researchers 
of executive pay have focused on the "arm's-
length bargaining model," according to which 
CEOs report to objective, independent board 
members who, in turn, report to shareholders. 
This standard principal-agent framework has 
been used in hundreds of academic papers. 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that empirical facts 
point to a very different explanatory frame-
work—a "managerial power" model. 
Pay without Performance has four main parts. 
In the First part the authors describe the "offi-
cial view" of executive pay, the one most schol-
ars hold. In this view, "boards, bargaining at 
arm's length with CEOs, negotiate pay arrange-
ments designed to serve shareholders' inter-
ests." In stoutly arguing that this model is not "a 
sufficiently accurate reflection of reality," 
Bebchuk and Fried marshal a long list of consid-
erations: for example, directors seek to be re-
elected to boards; CEOs have power to benefit 
directors (and vice-versa); boards may favor 
CEOs for a variety of social and psychological 
reasons; directors' costs for favoring CEOs are 
very low; and shareholders have very limited 
power to countervail these forces. 
The second part of the book elaborates the 
"managerial power" perspective and employs it 
to explain the "unfulfilled promise" of execu-
tive pay. Bebchuk and Fried argue that CEOs 
use their power "to secure rents—that is, extra 
value beyond what they would obtain under 
arm's-length bargaining." Although there are 
many new reporting requirements for firms, 
managers and boards are able to "camouflage" 
executives' compensation. The authors cite 
evidence that CEOs are more richly paid when 
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"(1) the board is relatively weak or ineffectual, 
(2) there is no large outside shareholder, (3) 
there are fewer institutional shareholders, and 
(4) managers are protected by anti-takeover 
amendments." As further evidence of "manage-
rial power," they mention such extras as gener-
ous severance packages and lucrative retire-
ment arrangements that are given on top of the 
perks contractually agreed to in advance, and 
generous executive loans that are often for-
given. 
Part 3 continues with the "managerial power" 
perspective. Bebchuk and Fried argue that 
there is little link between pay and performance 
in large American firms. In part, this is due to 
the fact that bonuses are sometimes not offered 
for performance, there are bonuses for acquisi-
tions even though they may not be in the best 
interests of shareholders or related to firm per-
formance, and there is generous severance even 
for CEOs who "fail." Moreover, since stock 
options are not indexed to market prices, CEOs 
may profit handsomely just by riding a growing 
stock market; and options are often "re-priced" 
when stock prices fall and lose their incentive 
effects. 
Although Bebchuk and Fried say that their 
purpose is to point out problems with the sys-
tem and not necessarily to provide remedies, 
the last part of the book discusses a set of 
potential reforms that they argue would help to 
improve both executive pay and, more gener-
ally, corporate governance. They feel that re-
cent reforms have done some good but that 
much more can be done. The root of the 
problem, they argue, is the failure to recognize 
that boards of directors need a fundamentally 
different set of "incentives and constraints." 
Central to their host of recommendations is the 
premise that directors are too independent of 
shareholders (the owners of the firm). Accord-
ing to Pay without Performance, little can be done 
about CEO pay until limits are placed on 
director independence , including new rules 
for director compensation, elections, and ac-
countability. These types of reforms, the 
authors argue, would help lead to more trans-
parency in CEO pay, and would promote com-
pensation that is more closely linked to firm 
performance. 
The book is exceptionally well written and 
clear. The authors succinctly present their main 
argument early on, then dedicate the rest of the 
book to elaborating and supporting it. If one 
ignores the endnotes, the reading is very smooth, 
quick, and easy, suiting it for a mass audience. 
Readers who are already familiar with the cor-
porate governance literature are not left high 
and dry, however, because the extensive 
endnotes—497 of them following only 216 pages 
of text—provide plentiful details. Poring 
through these notes is somewhat grueling, but 
it is essential for anyone who wishes to evaluate 
the validity of Bebchuk and Fried's claims. The 
nature of the literature they cite in support of a 
given argument, for example, can itself be re-
vealing: sometimes they refer to papers pub-
lished in the best journals in economics, law, 
and finance, sometimes to newspaper accounts; 
sometimes they refer to only a part of an aca-
demic study, or to a study that is out of date in 
the light of recent governance reforms. 
The book's main weakness, I believe, is too 
heavy a focus on the thesis that "managerial 
power and influence have shaped the executive 
compensation landscape." In comparing the 
explanatory power of the "arms-length bargain-
ing" model to that of the "managerial power" 
model, the authors imply that the former is 
practically worthless and the latter almost full-
purpose. For example, to support their claim 
that "boards often lower the goal posts when it 
appears that CEOs are unlikely to achieve their 
designated targets, or indeed have already 
missed them," Bebchuk and Fried cite anec-
dotal evidence and an article from the New York 
Times, but not convincing academic empirical 
support. The strain of trying to fit all relevant 
phenomena into the "managerial power" frame-
work is also clear, for example, in some rebut-
tals of other scholars' criticisms. For example, 
Kevin J. Murphy argued that new CEOs are 
likely to have less power when they negotiate 
their pay package than do continuing CEOs, 
who may be more entrenched ("Explaining 
Executive Compensation: Managerial Power vs. 
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options," University 
of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, 2002). This is 
certainly a plausible and empirically testable 
idea. But rather than accept it and move on, 
Bebchuk and Fried maintain that negotiations 
with these new CEOs "still have deviated sub-
stantially from [the arm's-length] model." An-
other example is an issue raised by Brian Hall 
and Kevin J. Murphy in "The Trouble with Stock 
Options" (Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 
17, 2003): whereas new, stricter disclosure re-
quirements that were instituted in the early 
1990s should have slowed CEO pay growth if the 
"managerial power" model is correct, in fact 
CEO pay continued to escalate. Bebchuk and 
Fried counter that other circumstances that 
also were changing at the time (such as anti-
takeover defenses) "more than offset the effect 
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of better disclosure"—but they support this claim 
with no empirical tests. 
One can easily agree with the main points 
Bebchuk and Fried make and with the reason-
ableness of several of their recommendations 
without being convinced that all roads lead to 
the "managerial power" theory. Speaking for 
myself, I would have found the book more per-
suasive if the authors had reined in their horses 
at certain points. 
This stimulating book raises many questions 
that can inspire future work. For example, what 
accounts for the big difference in pay-setting 
between the United States and the rest of the 
world? Will the new exchange reforms make a 
big difference, and if so, how big, relative to the 
extent of the changes Bebchuk and Fried advo-
cate? Will Sarbanes-Oxley, the 2002 act regulat-
ing corporate financial record-keeping and pro-
viding penalties for its abuse, make much of a 
difference in the long run? 
Bebchuk and Fried's book is important for a 
variety of reasons. First, it carefully articulates 
the difference between the often-relied-upon 
"arm's-length bargaining" framework and the 
"managerial power" perspective. Second, it 
neatly organizes a wealth of new evidence on 
executive pay in America today. Not only do the 
reference section's 257 entries comprise a com-
prehensive listing of important academic stud-
ies, but the authors also present scores of anec-
dotes illuminating the "facts on the ground"— 
actual CEO pay plans and corporate governance 
situations. Third, the book is accessible to a 
wide audience. Even though there have been 
many recent reforms in corporate governance 
(Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, and new regula-
tions affecting stock exchanges), this clear, force-
ful book will doubtless fuel additional reforms 
and academic studies in the corporate gover-
nance arena. The book has helped spark many 
new papers already, and I feel this is just the 
beginning. 
Kevin F. Halloch 
Associate Professor 




Comparative Industrial Relations 
Corporate Governance and Labour Management: 
An International Comparison. Ed i t ed by 
Howard Gospel a n d Andrew P e n d l e t o n . 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
3 2 5 p p . ISBN0-19-926367-1,$99.50 (c lo th) . 
Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
dissolution of the USSR, social scientists have 
paid increasing attention to the cross-country 
differences in socio-economic institutions that 
define "varieties of capitalism" (the term Peter 
Hall and David Soskice adopted for the title of 
their influential 2001 book) among the advanced 
capitalist societies. In examining the linkages 
between corporate governance and labor man-
agement, a distinction has conventionally been 
drawn between two main varieties: market or 
outsider systems (exemplified by the United 
States and United Kingdom), and relational or 
insider arrangements (exemplified by Germany 
and Japan) . As Howard Gospel and Andrew 
Pendleton observe in their introductory chap-
ter to Corporate Governance and Labour Manage-
ment, a comparative survey of the evolving links 
between corporate governance, finance, and 
labor management is timely. First, high-profile 
corporate scandals have prompted a re-evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of corporate gover-
nance arrangements and reforms, proposed or 
actual, in several countries. Second, in the 
context of the globalization of financial and 
capital markets, intensifying international com-
petition in markets for products and services, 
and growing cross-border mobility of produc-
tive capital, the future of some national mod-
els—primarily of the relational variant—has 
been questioned. Put another way, whether 
relational systems of corporate governance and 
labor management are converging on the mar-
ket-oriented Anglo-Saxon model has been widely 
debated. 
This volume has two main objectives: to 
bring together analysis of systems of corporate 
governance and labor management both over 
time and in different national contexts (specifi-
cally, in eight advanced capitalist societies); 
and to explore how corporate governance and 
labor management interact to create distinct 
national configurations. In pursuing the latter 
objective, the contributors are alert to the im-
pact that labor can have on corporate gover-
nance—something that is more apparent in the 
economies of continental western and north-
ern Europe and Japan than in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The opening chapter also maps out 
more ambitious tasks. One is to go beyond the 
"oversimplified" (p. 14) distinction between 
market and relational systems to a more nu-
